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NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EMPLOYEES' FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS BEYOND THEIR WORK SPACE: THE EMPLOYMENT RELA
TIONSHIP AS A SOURCE OF PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS

It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions
for the security of person and property should be liberally con
strued. A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right ... .1
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following situation. Police enter the office build
ing of XYZ Corporation without a search warrant and without con
sent. The building is not open to the general public; access is
primarily limited to employees. The police seize items from Jane
Doe's office on the second floor and from another room on the
third floor. These items are later used as evidence to indict Doe on
criminal charges.
Doe is likely to argue that the items were illegally obtained in
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights2 and cannot be intro
duced into evidence at her trial. Before Doe can seek the remedy
of the exclusionary rule? she must first meet certain requirements
1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Id.

3. The exclusionary rule is a remedy available to the court when a Fourth
Amendment violation has been established and which results in the inadmissibility of
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to establish a constitutional violation. Doe must establish that the
rooms searched were places in which one could have a "legitimate
expectation of privacy."4 More specifically, she must demonstrate
that the search and seizure violated her Fourth Amendment rights,
as opposed to those of her employer or another employee. s This
latter criterion is often referred to as establishing "standing" to as
sert a constitutional violation. 6
Doe is likely to be able to establish standing with respect to the
search of her own office.? However, her ability to establish stand
ing with respect to the search of the room beyond her office may
prove more difficult. ~ variety of factors, such as whether other
employees have access to that room or whether Doe's work estab
lishes some connection to that room, may be relevant to the court's
decision. 8
This Note examines the issue of what establishes the basis
upon which an employee may assert a Fourth Amendment claim
when police conduct a search beyond her own workspace. 9 The Su
the illegally obtained evidence at trial. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
171 (1969). The rule was originally established for evidence obtained by federal offi
cials in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1914) and later extended to state
officials in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The fundamental purpose of the
rule is to deter illegal police conduct. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974) (stating that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved").
4. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
5. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86 (1980) (stating that the defendant
must show that he is a "victim of an invasion of privacy") (quoting Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)).
6. See infra note 60 for an explanation of standing and the distinction between
the constitutional requirement and the judicially created requirement imposed by the
Supreme Court for Fourth Amendment claims in particular. In Rakas v. Illinois, the
Court expressly rejected a separate standing analysis and stated that it merged into the
substantive Fourth Amendment analysis. 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). The courts, how
ever, have continued to use the phrase to encompass the issue germane to this Note.
See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d
299, 305 (1st Cir. 1980); Tobias v. IndianCl, 479 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. 1985); State v.
Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn. 1996).
7. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (holding that a Union official had
standing to object to a search of his office); United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 650
(2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the defendant may have had standing to object to a search of
his office).
8. See infra Part II for a discussion of the factors relied upon by the courts in
addressing this issue.
9. This Note solely addresses government searches pursuant to criminal investiga
tions. It does not address other problems that emerge when the government as em
ployer conducts searches. See Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 625, 645-63 (1992)
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preme Court has not precisely addressed this issue, although peti
tions for certiorari have been filed on several occasions to resolve
the question. lO The Court has, however, through case law address
ing workplace-related issues, set forth certain fundamental princi
ples relevant to the inquiry.u Guided by these principles, the lower
courts have developed their own criteria to answer this question.
Part I begins by examining how the Supreme Court has ad
dressed two questions central to resolving the issue in this Note: (1)
to what degree is the workplace a locus in which one can have pri
vacy expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment, and (2)
what establishes the basis upon which an employee may assert a
claim? In particular, this section analyzes Mancusi v. DeForte,12 the
Supreme Court case that most directly addresses an employee's pri
vacy expectations in a workplace environment shared with other
employees. Part II then discusses two approaches the lower courts
have developed in light of the principles articulated by the Supreme
Court. These approaches address the specific issue of an em
ployee's right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim in searches be
yond her workspace. Some of these courts have applied a "totality
of circumstances" test, using the same multi-factor approach they
apply in non-workplace contexts. Several other courts have devised
an approach specific to the workplace context, focusing on whether
the employee can demonstrate a "nexus" between her workspace
and the area searched. Part II then addresses a recent Tenth Circuit
decision, Anderson v. United States, 13 in which the court discusses
the competing merits of the two approaches.
Part III argues that both approaches fail to recognize how the
employment relationship provides a basis for privacy expectations.
This section contends that the collaborative nature of work and the
legal obligations that arise from this relationship establish a basis
for shared privacy rights between employer and employee. Part III
and Heather L. Hanson, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Are We Really
Being Reasonable?, 79 VA. L. REv. 243, 262-74 (1993), for a discussion of the issues
arising in workplace searches conducted by government employers.
10. See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the defendant had standing beyond workspace), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1159 (1999);
United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant did
not have standing in search of subordinate's office), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824 (1990);
United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the defendant did not
have standing in search of storage area), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
11. See infra Part I for a discussion of the Court's approach to workplace privacy
and an employee's right to assert a claim.
12. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
13. 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998).
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also examines how the courts have, in non-workplace contexts, re
lied on relationships as a basis for establishing Fourth Amendment
rights. This Note contends that courts recognize the employment
relationship as a source of Fourth Amendment rights for several
reasons: to protect people in a place in which they spend a signifi
cant portion of their time, to deter unwarranted government intru
sion, and to halt a disturbing trend towards using commercial
relationships as a basis for eroding Fourth Amendment rights be
yond the workplace. Finally, Part IV suggests an analytical model
that recognizes the employment relationship as a basis for Fourth
Amendment rights but· which also encompasses established Fourth
Amendment limiting principles to allow for legitimate police
intrusions.
I.

WORKPLACE PRIVACY

&

AN EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO ASSERT

A FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM

The fundamental inquiry in any Fourth Amendment claim is
"whether the disputed search ... has infringed an interest of the
defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to pro
tect. "14 To answer this question the courts often focus on two fac
tors. The first is whether the place searched was one in which a
person could have a legitimate expectation of privacy. IS The courts
have afforded varying degrees of Fourth Amendment protection
depending upon the nature of the location in which the search takes
place. 16 If one were to envision a spectrum, places such as open
fields would fall at one end, where no protection is affordedp while
one's own home would be at the opposite end, where the courts
traditionally have afforded the highest level of constitutional pro
14. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
15. Ia Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that
the Fourth Amendment protects places rather than people. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
The location, however, continues to be relevant for purposes of determining whether a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment took place. See, e.g., Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (concluding that a search in an open field does
not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy expectations); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927) (suggesting there is no expectation of privacy for a motorboat on high
seas).
16. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) ("An expectation of privacy
in commercial premises ... is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation
in an individual's home."); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 ("We have on numerous occasions
pointed out that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for
Fourth Amendment purposes.") (citations omitted).
17. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
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tection. 18 Consequently; in determining an employee's right to as
sert a Fourth Amendment claim, it is important to determine where
the workplace falls along this spectrum.
The second factor is whether the person asserting the claim has
a legitimate basis for asserting a claim. 19 The party asserting the
claim must have been "aggrieved" by the search-a victim of the
search as opposed to one who is incidentally harmed by a search
directed at another. 20 In order to make this determination, the
court examines the claimant's relationship to the place searched
and the item seized. 21 This inquiry is especially critical for employ
ees, where documents belonging to the employer are often the tar
get of a workplace search. 22
Part I.A discusses how the courts have historically viewed the
degree of Fourth Amendment protection afforded in the work
place. It also examines limitations imposed on that protection due
to the public or highly regulated nature of certain businesses. Next,
Part I.B examines the evolution of the Court's approach for deter
mining whether a person has been "aggrieved" by a search. This
section highlights the Mancusi v. DeForte23 decision in which the
Supreme Court addressed an employee's right to assert a claim
18. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 106-07 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting "the unique importance of the home - the most essential bastion of privacy
recognized by the law"); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (noting "the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our tradi
tions since the origins of the Republic").
19. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 (noting that the Katz decision instructs the courts
that Fourth Amendment protection depends upon "whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place").
20. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (distinguishing between
one who is a victim of a search and thus, aggrieved, as opposed to one who is not
targeted by the search and incidentally prejudiced), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Salvucci overruled the automatic standing
part of the Jones decision. See 448 U.S. at 85-86, 95. The other part, the "legitimately
on the premises" test, was overruled by Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142. However, the factual
setting in Jones would still satisfy the current Fourth Amendment standard of "legiti
mate expectation of privacy." See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43; see also Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1990) (noting that "the Rakas Court explicitly affirmed the
factual holding in Jones ").
21. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 (holding that the defendants' claim must fail since
"[t]hey asserted neither a property nor possessory interest in the [place searched], nor
an interest in the property seized").
22. See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting
that most cases that discuss employee standing involve seizure of work-related docu
ments from the workplace).
23. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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where he had neither property rights in the item seized nor exclu
sive use of the area searched.
A.

Fourth Amendment Protection in the Workplace

Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not ex
pressly refer to workplaces, the Supreme Court has long held that
commercial, as well as residential, premises fall within the Amend
ment's scope. 24 In one of the earliest cases to address the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that business papers must
be afforded the same protection as personal papers.25 The Court
recently noted that "[a]s with the expectation of privacy in one's
home, such an expectation in one's place of work is 'based upon
societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the
Amendment.' "26
For some time the courts failed to make any meaningful dis
tinction between the constitutional protection afforded in a home
and a place of business. 27 Eventually, two important distinctions
emerged. The first was that businesses, unlike homes, might be
open generally to the public. 28 The second was that businesses tend
to be subject to many more government regulations than residential
premises. 29 Both of these distinctions impact the degree of Fourth
Amendment protection one can expect in a workplace.
24. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358
(1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
25. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (calling the invoices that
the defendant was compelled to produce "private papers" and, thus, within the scope of
the Fourth Amendment).
26. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984».
27. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (discussing the
authority to search one's home or place of business); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298,305-06 (1921) (discussing the "security and privacy of the home or office"), over
ruled in part by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
28. This distinction is relevant not only for traditional workplaces, but any place
in which privacy is not possible due to the public nature of the place. See, e.g., Oliver,
466 U.S. at 179 (open fields); United States v. Brandon, 599 F.2d 112, 113 (6th Cir.
1979) (used car lot); State v. Herbest, 551 A.2d 442, 444 (Me. 1988) (reception area of
hospital emergency room); Commonwealth v. Adams, 341 A.2d 206, 210-11 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1975) (bus terminal); cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.").
29. See See, 387 U.S. at 545-46 (noting that businesses may reasonably be subject
to more inspections than homes).
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Public/Private Distinctions

While the Fourth Amendment requires that no warrants be is
sued without probable cause, no such warrant requirement applies
to enter premises that are open to the public. 3D The courts have
held on these grounds that police could accept a general public invi
tation to enter a business, albeit for reasons unrelated to the busi
ness's purpose, without a warrant. 31 Because the public invitation
creates the warrant exception, courts may limit this exception to
hours that the business is open to the public32 or to those portions
of the premises open to the public. 33
Likewise, an officer is "entitled to take note of objects in plain
view."34 Some courts have limited the plain view doctrine so that
the warrant exception applies only when police view objects within
the premises as a member of the public would. 35 Consequently, the
30. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4(b) (3d ed. 1996) (noting that various police investigative
conduct is permissible without warrants where the premises are open to the public).
31. E.g., United States v. Berrett, 513 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam);
see, e.g., Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413 (1984) (public lobby of motel
and restaurant); Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1355
(5th Cir. 1979) (real estate office); Cantizano v. United States, 614 A.2d 870, 873 (D.C.
1992) (per curiam) (mail courier office); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 895, 897
(Ky. 1971) (furniture store); State v. Lund, 409 So.2d 569, 570 (La. 1982) (bar); Sullivan
v. Dist. Court, 429 N.E.2d 335, 338-39 (Mass. 1981) (cafeteria in hospital); State ex reI.
Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Court of Appeals, 588 N.E.2d 116, 124-25 (Ohio
1992) (bookstore).
32. E.g., United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Commercial
establishments do not extend an implicit invitation to enter during nonbusiness hours or
when there are no employees on the premises."); see also Wilson, 475 S.W.2d at 898
(locker accessible at any time). But see United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165, 1168
(7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the defendant had no Fourth Amendment claim where
police gained entrance through a "technical trespass" after hours since he knowingly
left the item in a place open to the public).
33. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 271 A.2d 435, 439 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970)
(holding that "the rear room was not visible from [other parts of the store], and the
incursion to the rear room in the course of a thorough search of the whole first floor ...
was plainly not justified on the theory of store premises open to the public").
34. Berrett, 513 F.2d at 156; see Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985)
(finding no search where an officer purchased magazines from an adult bookstore and
then examined them to see if they were obscene); People v. Superior Court, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 507, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding no search where officer picked up a type
writer in a pawnshop to view the serial number); State v. Cockrum, 592 S.W.2d 300, 303
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (finding no search where officer examined serial numbers on appli
ances for sale in store).
35. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,329 (1979) (holding that the
government official had conducted a search in an adult bookstore where he viewed
films without paying for them as a customer would be required to do); see also Winters
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 F.3d 848, 854 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the police
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degree of access by the public may limit a business owner's, as well
as any employee's, right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.
2.

Closely Regulated Industries

Almost all businesses are subject to some form of government
regulation. 36 These regulations may include health and safety
codes, licensing requirements, or record keeping requirements. It
was not until 1967 that, in a pair of decisions, the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether government regulations would
reduce privacy expectations to such a degree that search warrants
might not be constitutionally required. 37
In those cases, the defendants were prosecuted for refusing to
allow city officials to conduct inspections pursuant to safety ordi
nances; one setting was residentiaP8 and the other was commer
cial.3 9 The Court held that "administrative entry, without consent,
upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to
the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical
force within the framework of a warrant procedure."40 The Court
noted, however, that there might be more situations in which it is
reasonable to inspect a business than a private home and that the
reasonableness of these inspections must be addressed on a case
by-case basis.41
Subsequently, the Court began to carve out exceptions to war
rant requirements for industries that had a history of government
oversight. 42 The Court eventually expanded the exception to en
compass "closely regulated" industries,43 regardless of whether
there was a history of oversight. 44 In New York v. Burger,45 the
conducted a search when they demanded that the clerk produce a ring described in the
pawnshop record even though the ring was located in a display case).
36. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.s.C. §§ 651-71 (1998).
37. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967).
38. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 527 (housing code inspection of residence).
39. See See, 387 U.S. at 541 (search pursuant to fire code enforcement).
40. Id. at 545.
41. See id. at 546.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun dealer); Colon
nade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor licensee).
43. Interestingly, the expansion to "closely regulated" businesses came out of a
case in which the Court held that an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
provision violated the Fourth Amendment. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
324-25 (1978).
44. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,605-06 (1981)(rejecting the length of time of
the oversight and instead focusing on "the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal
regulation" with regard to a search at a stone quarry); see also New York v. Burger, 482

2001]

EMPLOYEES' WORK SPACE PRIVACY

199

Court set some boundaries on these exceptions by establishing a
three-part test for determining whether warrantless inspections of
these businesses are reasonable. 46 Most importantly, the test re
quired specific statutory authorization for inspections to "provid[e]
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."47
The Burger Court had noted that "[a]n expectation of privacy
in commercial premises ... is different from, and indeed less than, a
similar expectation in an individual's home."48 The Tenth Circuit
later explained that a reduced expectation of privacy in the work
place is important for Fourth Amendment purposes in two ways.49
First, it "may justify a statutory authorization of warrantless ...
searches."50 Second, it may "affect the type of evidence that consti
tutes probable cause to obtain a search warrant. "51
Consequently, the fact that a search is conducted on commer
cial premises does not automatically result in reduced Fourth
Amendment protection.52 The public nature of a business may af
fect privacy expectations and thus, limit protection. Likewise, a
business may be closely regulated and put on sufficient notice of
government oversight so that Fourth Amendment protection is
limited.
B.

An Employee's Right to Assert a Fourth Amendment Claim
Like Fourth Amendment claims in other settings, courts ana-

U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (finding that a warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulated
business may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
45. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
46. Id. at 702-03. The test required: 1) the regulation must be informed by a
substantial government interest; 2) warrantless inspections must be necessary to carry
out the regulatory purpose; and 3) a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant
must be specified in the statute's inspection provision in terms of certainty and regular
ity of its application. Id.
47. Id. at 703 (alteration in original) (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603) (noting
that the statute must be sufficiently defined to put a business on notice that it is subject
to inspections and that the inspector's discretion must be limited in time, place, and
scope).
48. /d. at 700.
49. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 597-98 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing
privacy expectations in a commercial setting); accord Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v.
Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1216 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (comparing entry onto commercial
versus private premises).
50. Leary, 846 F.2d at 597 n.6 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 597-98 n.6 (citing Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 659 F.2d at 1216-17 n.5).
52. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 659 F.2d at 1216 n.5 (stating that except in rare
instances, a warrant is as necessary to support a search of commercial premises as pri
vate premises).
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lyzed early workplace cases by focusing on property rights. 53 The
right to suppress evidence was linked to the right to seek the return
of one's own property. 54 Therefore, if a person did not have owner
ship, she could not be "aggrieved" by a search and seizure. 55 Cor
porations were considered "persons" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and, thus, could assert claims as property own
ers. 56 Corporate shareholders, however, could not assert a claim
without an interest independent of the corporation's right.57
Eventually the courts expanded the scope of Fourth Amend
ment protection to include persons with possessory as well as pro
prietary interests. 58 However, the court maintained that a claimant
had to have a personal basis for asserting a claim.59 The courts ana
lyzed this expanded basis for asserting a claim under the rubric of
"standing."60 A non-corporate employee could establish a suffi
53. Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1937) (discussing the defendants'
property rights with respect to telegrams seized); Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d
290, 293 (3d Cir. 1937) (rejecting the defendants' claims because they had no property
rights); see Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 309-27 (1998) (discussing the Su
preme Court's transition from its property-based inquiry to the reasonable expectation
of privacy test in Fourth Amendment claims).
54. See Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932) ("The power to sup
press the use of evidence unlawfully obtained is a corollary of the power to regain it.").
55. Until 1972, the term "aggrieved persons" was the phrase used in the Federal
Rules for parties who were entitled to make motions for the return of property seized
and motions to suppress. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). The rule was subsequently di
vided and section (f), which now addresses motions to suppress, no longer uses the
term. See id. at 41(f).
56. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (hold
ing that a corporation has a right against unlawful search and seizure of its property).
57. Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (hold
ing that an officer and sole shareholder of a corporation had no right to assert a Fourth
Amendment claim where corporate records were seized). "When a man chooses to
avail himself of the privilege of doing business as a corporation, even though he is its
sole shareholder, he may not vicariously take on the privilege of the corporation under
the Fourth Amendment. . .. Its wrongs are not his wrongs; its immunity not his immu
nity." Id.
58. Proprietary interest is the interest of an owner of property including various
rights that the owner has by virtue of his ownership. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
816 (7th ed. 1999). Possessory interest is the right to exercise control over property to
the exclusion of others but it need not be through title to the property. See id. at 1185.
59. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973) (stating that "[fjourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may
not be vicariously asserted") (citations omitted).
60. The term "standing" may be used to refer to two different requirements. See
United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1991). One is a constitutionally
based requirement found in the phrase "case or controversy" in Article III of the Con
stitution. Id. A party asserting a constitutional challenge "must allege such a personal
stake or interest in the outcome . . . as to assure the concrete adverseness which
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cient interest to have standing if her office was searched and her
work papers were seized. 61 Employees who did not have such in
terest and were merely unlucky enough to be present when police
seized incriminating evidence did not have a sufficient basis upon
which to assert a c1aim. 62
Beginning in 1960, the Supreme Court began a major shift in
Fourth Amendment analysis. In Jones v. United States ,63 the Court
rejected the idea that property law should control a person's ability
to establish standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. 64
Art[icle] III requires." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n.2 (1978). The constitu
tional standing requirement is primarily used to determine whether a party has the right
to bring a private suit. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 103
(1998). The party bringing suit must show injury in fact - a concrete and actual or
imminent harm, causation - a sufficient connection between the plaintiff's injury and
the defendant's conduct, and redressability - a likelihood that the relief available
through the court will redress the injury. Id. Since Fourth Amendment claims are
raised in criminal cases, where the personal stake element is readily apparent, the con
stitutional requirement is met. LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3, at 117.
The second requirement, judicially created, is used specifically in Fourth Amend
ment claims to address a party's basis for asserting a claim. Taketa, 923 F.2d at 669.
The fact that Fourth Amendment "standing" is a judicially created requirement is
evinced by the Rakas Court's rejection of this component as a separate inquiry in
Fourth Amendment claims. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 n.2 (making a distinction between
the two standing components).
61. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932) (distinguishing
searches of one's office for evidence, like papers, from searches to find stolen goods);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-13 (1921) (seizing papers).
62. See, e.g., Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1937) (holding
that "unless the defendants claim the ownership of the property seized ... they have no
constitutional rights to object to its production in evidence and have no standing in
order to avail themselves of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment"); United
States v. Conoscente, 63 F.2d 811, 811 (2d Cir. 1933) (per curiam) (finding that a work
man in occupancy but not dwelling on the premises did not have interest in the property
seized or the premises searched and had no right to assert a claim); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that a night watchman did not have
possessory rights because those rights remained with his employer and therefore, he
could not assert a claim).
63. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83 (1980). See supra note 20 for the current importance of the Jones case after
Salvucci was decided.
64. Id. at 261 (extending the exclusionary rule to avoid requiring defendants to
claim ownership of narcotics in order to obtain protection against the illegal search).
The Court found:
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the con
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle dis
tinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has
been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical . . .. Distinc
tions such as those qetween "lessee," "licensee," "invitee" and "guest," ...
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The important distinction instead was between one who is "a victim
of a search or seizure . . . as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a conse
quence of a search or seizure directed at someone else."65 A per
son legitimately present in the place searched and who was targeted
by the search had standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. 66
In 1967, the Court issued its landmark Fourth Amendment de
cision, Katz v. United States. 67 This decision articulated a new stan
dard for determining if a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment had been conducted: whether the person had a subjec
t.ive expectation of privacy that was objectively reasonable in the
place searched. 68 One year later, the Court indicated how this new
standard would impact an employee's standing to challenge a work
place search.
1.

Reasonable Expectations of Freedom from Government
Intrusion: Mancusi v. DeForte

In Mancusi v. DeForte,69 the government had conducted a war
rantless search of a Teamster's Union office as a result of a conspir
acy and extortion investigation. 70 The scope of the search included
a large room used as an office by defendant DeForte, a Union vice
president, as well as by several other Union officers. 71 Over the
defendant's objections, papers belonging to the Union were seized
from the office.72 The papers were later used at trial to convict De
Forte. 73 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that DeForte had
ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards.
Id. at 266.
65. Id. at 261.
66. Id. at 265-67 (noting that the defendant had established a sufficient interest in
the premises searched by his legitimate presence therein). The defendant had spent at
least a night in the apartment, he had been given keys to the apartment, and had kept
some clothes there. Id. at 259.
67. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). One scholar referred to Katz as "mark[ing] a watershed
in [F]ourth [A]mendment jurisprudence." Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 382 (1974).
68. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's concurrence
established the two-prong inquiry viewed universally as the "Katz test". See LAFAVE,
supra note 30, § 2.1(b), at 384-85 (noting that both the lower courts and the Supreme
Court relied upon Justice Harlan's explanation of the Katz holding).
69. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
70. Id. at 365.
71. [d. at 368.
72. [d. at 365.
73. Id.
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standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim despite his failure to
establish a property interest in the office or the papers seized.74
Since DeForte had no property rights to establish standing, the
Mancusi Court inquired instead whether, in light of all circum
stances, the office was a place in which there was a "reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion."75 DeForte
spent considerable time in the office and, at the time of the search,
had custody of the papers seized.76 The office, however, was not
DeForte's private office and the records were not taken from an
area that was reserved for his personal use.77
The Court focused on the question of whether the defendant
had the right to exclude others from the place searched and the
items seized. 78 It concluded that it was immaterial that the work
space was shared as long as the defendant could still reasonably
expect that access would be limited to the others with whom he
shared the office and guests invited by those persons. 79 The Court
further noted that the defendant could reasonably expect that no
one would have access to the records seized without the permission
of the persons with whom he shared the office or without permis
sion from his superiors. 80 Therefore, DeForte had a reasonable ex
pectation of freedom from governmental intrusion and had
standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation.
The dissent had argued that an employee suffers no personal
injury when the property of a corporation is seized, and hence,
there was no basis upon which to claim a constitutional violation. 81
Certainly a person could not be a "victim" of a search and seizure if
he or she was not the target of the search. 82 It was immaterial, ac
74. Id. at 369.
75. Id. at 368.
76. Id. at 368-69.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 369 (comparing the right to exclude others from a private office to
one's right in an office shared by others).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 373-74 (Black, J., dissenting). This view is based on the principle that a
corporation is the holder of property rights and thus the party who may rightfully assert
a Fourth Amendment claim. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (6th
Cir. 1991) (stating that a corporate officer may be the "person aggrieved" by corporate
search); United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1055 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that a corpo
rate officer may be able to assert the right to privacy). But see Lagow v. United States,
159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (discussing how a sole shareholder does
not get the privilege of a corporation under the Fourth Amendment).
82. Id. at 376-77 (Black, J., dissenting). See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(h), at
212-19 for a discussion of the idea of "target standing" where a person targeted by the
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cording to the dissent, whether or not the employee actually pre
pared documents or was entrusted by the employer to keep custody
of the papers.83
Two important points emerged from the Court's holding. First,
a defendant without property rights to either the place searched or
the item seized may have a sufficient expectation of privacy to es
tablish standing in a workplace search. Second, the use of an area
need not be exclusive in order for a defendant to have standing.
This point is of particular importance in workplace searches where
employees may be likely to share work areas or to use multiple
areas within the workplace.
2.

"Legitimate" Expectations of Privacy

After the Court eliminated legal possession or ownership as a
requirement for establishing standing, the role of property rights in
determining privacy expectations began to re-emerge. As a result,
with its decision in Rakas v. Illinois ,84 the Court began to narrow85
or refine, depending on one's perspective, the broad language of
the Katz standard. 86 The first step taken by the Court was to elimi
nate the question of standing as a distinct inquiry from the substan
tive question of whether the search and seizure infringed an interest
of the defendant that the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect. 87
search is considered for standing purposes to be a person aggrieved by, or a victim of, a
search.
83. Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 373-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
84. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
85. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 111 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Court has "veer[ed] sharply from the path" set out in Katz); Rawlings
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 115 n.* (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's restrictive standard of "legitimate expectation of privacy" narrowed the privacy
interests from Katz).
86. See Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures,
and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 914 (1997)
(calling the Katz standard "broad" as compared to the strict property-based Fourth
Amendment analysis that preceded Katz); Eulis Simien, Jr., The Interrelationship of the
Scope of Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK.
L. REV. 487, 525 (1988) (stating that "Fourth amendment [sic] protection reached its
height in Katz"). Some members of the Court have been highly critical of the Katz test
as setting forth an unworkable standard. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concur
ring) (calling it "notoriously unhelpful" and "self-indulgent" because of its subjectivity).
87. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138-40. Despite the Court's rejection of a separate
standing inquiry, many courts continue to use the term in their analysis. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 97 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States
v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 1980); Tobias v. State, 479 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind.
1985); State. v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn. 1996).
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In addition, the Court rejected the standard it had set forth
earlier in Jones, in which a person, by virtue of being legitimately
on the premises, had the right to assert a Fourth Amendment
claim. 88 The Court determined that the standard was too broad
since it would permit even a casual visitor to assert a claim. 89 In
stead, a person must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of pri
vacy in the place searched. 90
In explaining the importance of property rights in establishing
privacy expectations, the Court noted that:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main
rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others and one
who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of
this right to exclude. 91

In his concurrence, Justice Powell addressed the dissenters' ar
gument that the plurality had reverted back to tying Fourth
Amendment rights to property law.92 He noted that the ultimate
question, whether a person's privacy expectations were reasonable,
required an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances. 93 Prop
erty rights were merely one of several factors to be considered, with
no single factor dispositive. 94 Other important considerations in
cluded whether the person had taken measures to guard their pri
vacy, how the person had used the location searched, and whether
it was the kind of intrusion historically found to be objectionable. 95
In a highly criticized decision one year later, Rawlings v. Ken
tucky,96 the Court held that property rights in an item seized does
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143.
91. [d. at 143 n.12 (citations omitted).
92. [d. at 150 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 156-57 (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's decision to tie Fourth Amendment rights back to property
laws was motivated by its concerns about the exclusionary rule's impact).
93. [d. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
94. [d. (Powell, J., concurring).
95. [d. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring). The totality approach and the factors
cited by Justice Powell were adopted by the majority in subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
177-78 (1984).
96. 448 U.S. 98, 117-18 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's
decision resulted from too narrow a reading of the Fourth Amendment); State v. Tan
88.
89.
90.
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not automatically esfablish one's legitimate expectation of pri
vacy.97 This aspect of the Rawlings holding may have been clarified
to some extent by the Court's subsequent decision in O'Connor v.
Ortega. 98 In that decision, which addressed a workplace search by a
government employer, the Court noted that certain kinds of per
sonal items found in the workplace, such as luggage, handbags, or
briefcases signal to others by their private nature that the owner has
legitimate privacy expectations in the contents therein. 99
A more troubling aspect of Rawlings, especially as it affects
searches beyond an employee's work area, is its potential limita
tions on the Mancusi lOo holding. Rawlings had hidden drugs in an
acquaintance's purse. lOl The Court found that Rawlings did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy since another friend's ac
cess demonstrated that he did not have the right to exclude others
from the purse. l02 In Mancusi, the defendant was allowed to assert
a claim despite sharing access with others to the area searched.103
More importantly, Rawlings suggests that the defendant's burden
of proof is to show an expectation of freedom from all intrusions,
rather than the Mancusi standard of an expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion. 104 If the lower courts were to apply
ner, 745 P.2d 757, 762, 762-63 n.7 (Or. 1987) (in banc) (disapproving of the Rawlings
approach and stating that if A allows B to store property on A's property, then B
should be able to assert a claim for a search uncovering B's property); LAFAVE, supra
note 30, §l1.3(d), at 164 n.l91 (calling it a "poorly-reasoned case"); Simien Jr., supra
note 86, at 490-92 (calling the Court's move to eliminate property rights as a separate
basis upon which to assert a Fourth Amendment claim a "bloodless coup").
97. 448 U.S. at 105-06.
98. 480 U.S. at 712 (addressing the appropriate standard for searches where the
government is acting as employer, rather than as criminal investigator). Ortega was a
doctor whose office was searched while he was on administrative leave due to allega
tions of sexual harassment and other inappropriate conduct. Id. The Court established
a different and lower standard, reasonableness, for searches when the government is
acting as an employer. See id. at 722-23; United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 674 (9th
Cir. 1991) (calling the O'Connor standard the "lesser burden of reasonableness").
99. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16 (discussing the importance of the context of a
search). But see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301-07 (1999) (finding that the
defendant could not assert a claim where her purse was taken from the back seat of a
car in which she was a passenger). It is important to note that in Rawlings, the defen
dant's property, his drugs, were found in someone else's purse. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at
101.
100. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
101. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 101.
102. Id. at 105-06.
103. See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369 (noting that it viewed no fundamental differ
ence between a private office, in which the defendant could exclude all others, and an
office space shared with others).
104. Compare Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-05 (discussing the defendant's lack of
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the Rawlings standard, it would be difficult for employees to assert
Fourth Amendment claims in areas to which other employees have
access.

II.

SEARCHES BEYOND ONE'S WORKSPACE

It is clearly established that the Fourth Amendment extends to
commercial premises. lOS Although property rights are not control
ling in Fourth Amendment claims, those with property rights to the
workplace are likely to be able to assert a claim to searches
throughout the premises. 106 Thus, a corporation107 as well as a sole
proprietor of a business108 will usually be able to assert a Fourth
Amendment claim. However, as noted in the previous section,
these property owners' privacy expectations may be sufficiently re
duced where the business is open to the public or is closely regu
lated so that entry by police will not be subject to warrant
requirements. 109
Employees, on the other hand, usually do not have property
rights to the workplace itself. The Supreme Court has affirmed that
an employee usually has a legitimate expectation of privacy in her
own workspace. 110 The Court has not, however, addressed the
privacy expectations since other friends of the woman who owned the purse had ac
cess), with Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 368 (noting that a Fourth Amendment right "depends
upon whether the area [searched] was one in which there was a reasonable expectation
of freedom from governmental intrusion") (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
352 (1967)). The Court noted that "DeForte still could reasonably have expected that
only those persons and their personal or business guests would enter the office, and that
records would not be touched except with their permission or that of [company] higher
ups." Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369.
105. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); See v. City of Seat
tle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390 (1920).
106. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(d), at 163 (noting "it is fair to say that a
defendant who does show ... [a property right in the invaded place] is most certain to
be found to have standing").
107. See Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 390 (corporation); United States v.
Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1988) (corporation and corporate officer); cf
Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (distinguishing a
corporate officer's rights from a corporation).
108. See United States v. Trickey, 711 F.2d 56, 57 (6th Cir. 1983) (sole proprietor
of outer building on property); State v. Penn, 576 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Ohio 1991) (phar
macyowner).
109. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of these limitations on Fourth Amend
ment workplace claims.
110. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716-17 (1987); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364,369-70 (1968).
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scope of Fourth Amendment protection when the search extends
beyond the employee's workspace.
Relying on guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court,
the lower courts have essentially developed two approaches to de
termine whether an employee has established a legitimate expecta
tion of privacy in a search beyond her own workspace.111 One of
these approaches weighs the "totality of circumstances," while the
other focuses on the employee's ability to show a "nexus" to their
own workspace. Parts II.A and B examine the application of these
two approaches. Part II.C then examines a recent Tenth Circuit de
cision, United States v. Anderson,112 in which the court discussed the
competing merits of the two approaches in resolving this
question. l13
A.

Totality of Circumstances

When addressing the question of whether an employee's
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated in a search beyond
her workspace, many courts apply the same analytical framework
that is utilized in non-workplace contexts. 114 These courts, in keep
ing with Justice Powell's concurrence in Rakas v. Illinois,1l5 ex
amine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
employee has demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area searched. 116 The totality of circumstances may include
111. In at least one case, a court has applied both. See State v. Richards, 552
N.W.2d 197, 204-05 (Minn. 1996) (holding that the defendant could neither establish a
nexus between areas nor the requisite relationship to the item seized). In addition, the
Ninth Circuit has applied a third approach to limited circumstances, which it refers to as
the co-conspirator exception. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of that approach.
112. 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998).
113. It appears that this is the only case in which a court contemplated whether
one test was preferable over another. See id. at 1230-32.
114. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (affirming the Kentucky
Supreme Court's holding that under the "totality of the circumstances" the defendant
had not established a legitimate expectation of privacy in his associate's purse); United
States v. Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (finding that
the key holder to third person's apartment did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy based on the totality of circumstances).
115. In Rakas, Justice Powell explained that the reasonableness of Fourth
Amendment claims must be considered "in light of all of the surrounding circum
stances." 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (addressing an automobile
search). See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rakas
decision.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998)
(considering "all of the relevant circumstances"); United States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa,
140 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 1998) (considering the "nuclei of factors"); United States v.
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considerations of the employee's presence at the search-whether
the employee has an ownership interest in the item seized, whether
the employee took steps to guard her privacy, and whether the em
ployee's position relative to the business gave her particular rights
to the area searched.1 17
Each of the factors considered may in some way bear on the
employee's ability to exclude others from the place searched.1 18
The scope of protection that the totality approach affords in a
workplace search, therefore, may largely depend on whether the
defendant must demonstrate the right to exclude all others or
merely those who are not entitled through their work relationship
to have access to the area searched. The Supreme Court's holding
in Mancusi v. DeForte 119 would indicate that the latter, more liberal
approach might be applied in a workplace context. 120 The Court's
subsequent reasoning in Rawlings v. Kentucky,121 however, would
Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (looking at the "totality of circumstances");
United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir. 1980) (considering a "variety of
factors" suggested by the Supreme Court).
117. Brien, 617 F.2d at 306 (comparing favorably the factors considered by the
lower court: (1) the defendants' position in the business; (2) their ownership interest;
(3) their job responsibilities; (4) their power to exclude others from the place searched;
(5) whether they worked in the area and; (6) whether they were present at the time of
the search, with those articulated by the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois). In Rakas,
Justice Powell's concurrence noted that relevant factors included: whether the person
took customary precautions to maintain privacy, how the person has used the area
searched, whether the search took place in an area historically thought to be private,
and whether the person has property rights in the location searched. 439 U.S. at 152
(Powell, J., concurring).
118. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 n.12 (noting that property rights give rise to the
right to exclude others from access); Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1232 (considering the defen
dant's status as corporate officer as a basis for authority to exclude others); United
States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that a salesman's occasional
presence did not establish the right to exclude others from a desk which he shared with
others); see also Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding it dis
positive that employees did not have the right to exclude others from the factory prem
ises). One commentator has suggested that Fourth Amendment rights should be
determined on the basis of this criterion alone. See Clancy, supra note 53, at 344-65
(arguing that property and privacy as a basis for defining the scope of Fourth Amend
ment rights are too limited and that the right to exclude better protects an individual's
rights).
.
119. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the Mancusi
decision.
120. See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369 (noting that the defendant could assert a Fourth
Amendment claim despite the fact that the others with whom he shared the office,
higher up officials, as well as business and personal guests of those persons could all
have access to the records seized).
121. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rawlings.
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support the former, more restrictive approach.122
Illustrative of the courts' approach to this dilemma is the Kan
sas Supreme Court's reasoning in State v. Worrell. 123 In Worrell,
police retrieved shell casings from a search of the top floor of a
warehouse that linked the warehouse manager to a murder. 124 The
defendant, who was also charged with security for the building, had
been up there to shoot pigeons that had entered and set off the
security alarm. The top floor was not open to the public and was
mostly unused.1 25 The area, however, was accessible to other em
ployees when directed by the manager to perform tasks there, to
the business partners, and to several stockholders. The court, rely
ing largely on the fact that others had access to the upper floor, held
that the warehouse manager had no expectation of privacy
therein. 126 It appeared immaterial to the court that all persons hav
ing access were all entitled to do so through their relationship to the
business.
The Kansas court did not indicate whether its holding might
have differed if a smaller number of persons related to the business
had been entitled to access. Some courts applying the totality ap
proach have found that a defendant established a legitimate expec
tation of privacy where access was limited to a small number of
employees. 127 For instance, corporate officers established a legiti
mate expectation of privacy where police seized corporate docu
122. See Rawlings, 448 u.s. at 105 (noting the defendant's inability to control
access to the purse of an acquaintance in which his drugs were stored precluded his
right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim, even though only one other person had been
given "free access" to the purse).
123. 666 P.2d 703 (Kan. i983).
124. [d. at 704.
125. [d. at 706.
126. Id. The court also noted that neither the defendant's personal property nor
business records were stored there. [d.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 601 (1st Cir. 1985)
(holding that defendant who owned stock with only three others and who had keys to
the warehouse searched had a legitimate expectation of privacy), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Carter v. United States, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986); State v. Harms, 449
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Neb. 1989) (holding that a partner in a construction business had a Fourth
Amendment claim when a locked shed in which property was stored was searched and
only the two partners had keys). Most courts, however, have held that having keys to
the place searched in and of itself does not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy.
See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that it
disagreed with the lower court's reasoning that the defendant established privacy ex
pectations because he had a key to the locked building); United States v. Baron-Man
tilla, 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that a key to the premises
is insufficient to establish privacy expectation); State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197,204
05 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a defendant who had one of two keys to the building
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ments stored in locked file cabinets and in rooms to which only a
few persons, including the defendants, had access.128
Most claims arising from workplace searches involve the sei
zure of work-related materials. 129 Where, instead, personal items
have been seized, the employee's own property rights may allow
her to take certain measures to sufficiently limit access by others to
establish privacy expectations under the totality approach.130 Fur
thermore, as the Supreme Court noted in, O'Connor v. Ortega,
some items may be so universally understood as personal that the
nature of the item itself signals to others one's privacy expect a
tions. l3l Thus, an employee may have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in items such as a briefcase or purse, regardless of access by
other employees to the area in which the item is located. 132
Illustrative of the totality approach where personal property
has been seized is the First Circuit's decision in United States v.
Mancini.l 33 In Mancini, the court held that the town's mayor had a
legitimate expectation of privacy where his appointment calendar
could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim where nothing indicated that the items
stored therein were personal).
128. United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir. 1980) (affirming the
district court's finding that the defendants had standing to object to the search). The
court also noted that the office in which the search took place, a commodity options
firm, was heavily secured from access by the public. Id. at 306 0.9.
129. See Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1230 (noting that "[m]ost cases that discuss em
ployee standing involve seizure of work-related documents from the workplace."). In
some instances, it is difficult to classify the materials either as personal or work-related.
See, e.g., Tobias v. State, 479 N.E.2d 508, 509-10 (Ind. 1985) (involving a seizure of a vial
of pills which were stored above the ceiling in the public bathroom of a pharmacy).
130. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that property
rights give rise to the right to exclude others from access).
131. The plurality in O'Connor v. Ortega noted that:
Not everything that passes through the confines of the business address can be
considered part of the workplace context. ... An employee may bring closed
luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip, or a handbag or briefcase each
workday. While whatever expectation of privacy the employee has in the exis
tence and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected by its presence in
the workplace, the employee's expectation of privacy in the contents of the
luggage is not affected in the same way.
480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (emphasis in original).
132. See id. (noting that "[t]he appropriate standard for a workplace search does
not necessarily apply to a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase
that happens to be within the employer's business address"). Not alI personal items
carry that same societal expectation of privacy. See United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d
104, 109 (1st CiT. 1993) (stating that "[t]he most intimate of documents, if left strewn
about in the most public of places, would surely not [give rise to an expectation of
privacy]") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
133. 8 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1993).
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was seized from a box in the attic of the building in which he
workedp4 The mayor had clearly marked the box to indicate that
it contained his property.l35 Although he had given his chief of
staff authority to go into the box, other employees knew not to ex
amine the contents without authorization.136 Both the maintenance
and personnel departments, however, had keys to the atticP7 The
court found that, in light of his efforts to control access by others,
the mayor had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal
property.138
In sum, the totality approach aggregates various facts to deter
mine if, as a whole, they demonstrate an employee's legitimate ex
pectation of privacy. Many of these factors relate to an employee's
right to exclude others from the place searched. Personal property
rights or a position of authority among a small number of employ
ees may establish a basis upon which to assert this authority.139
This approach, however, provides no clear answer to the question
of to what extent this right must be asserted: whether an employee
must be able to exclude all others from the area searched, whether
she must be one of a limited number of persons to have access, or
whether she may exclude only those who do not have the right to
access through their work relationship.140
B.

The Nexus Test

The totality approach analyzes a workplace claim in the same
manner as searches conducted in other contexts. Thus, factors spe
cifically relevant to the workplace are not raised. 141 Some other
134. Id. at 110.
135. The box was marked "Mayor's Appointment Books." Id. at 107 n.6.
136. Id. at 110 n.11 (quoting from a city employee's testimony).
137. Id. at 106.
138. Id. at 110 (stating that "Mancini could have expected that only members of
the maintenance or personnel staff, who had instructions not to disturb the Mayor's
boxes, could enter the attic, and that his personal records would not be touched except
with his permission or that of his Chief of Staff."). The court also noted that the Mayor
had worked in the building for nineteen years and that the attic was upstairs in the
building in which he worked during this time. [d. This may relate to one factor the
court weighed in its consideration - the historical use of the property. See id. at 109
(setting forth the relevant factors).
139. See id. at 110 (personal property); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 306
n.9 (1st Cir. 1980) (defendant corporate officers were among the few entitled to access).
140. For instance, the First Circuit's decision in Mancini may be reconciled with
the narrower scope of the Supreme Court's holding in Rawlings v. Kentucky as well as
the broader scope of the Court's Mancusi v. DeForte decision. See supra Part ILA and
infra Part II.B for a discussion of both Supreme Court cases.
141. But see Brien, 617 F.2d at 306 (considering the defendants' positions in the
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courts have relied upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mancusi
v. DeForte to create an approach specific to workplace claims.142
Recall that in Mancusi, work-related documents were seized from
somewhere in a large room in which the defendant had a desk along
with several others. 143 Using this setting as a starting point, these
courts have determined that an employee's privacy expectation may
extend beyond their exclusive workspace if the employee can
demonstrate some "nexus" between the area searched and their
workspace. l44 An employee may show a nexus was established by
showing some relationship between the area searched and one's
employment activities. 145
The nexus test was first expressly articulated in a Fifth Circuit
case, Britt v. United States .146 In that case, a corporate president
attempted to suppress documents that were seized from a building
used by the corporation as a storage space,147 Because the docu
ments were corporate property and Britt was not the corporation's
sole shareholder, he had to establish a basis independent from the
corporation's upon which to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.148
firm). The First Circuit determined that the lower court's factors were consistent with
the usual factors considered by the courts under the totality approach. [d.
142. See United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th CiT. 1975) (comparing the
Mancusi facts with the ones at issue in Britt, noting that in Mancusi, "there was a
demonstrated nexus between the area searched and the work space of the defendant.");
LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(d), at 164 (calling this approach consistent with Mancusi
and noting that it "is more likely to be relevant with respect to a far greater variety of
officers and employees of various business enterprises" than the usual approach). See
supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the Mancusi case.
143. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968).
144. Some courts expressly refer to a "nexus" in their decisions, while others rely
on the nexus reasoning without using the term. Compare United States v. Anderson,
154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th CiT. 1998) (Kelly, J., dissenting) ("nexus"), and United States
v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d CiT. 1990) ("nexus"), and Britt, 508 F.2d at 1056
("nexus"), and Tobias v. State, 479 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. 1985) ("nexus"), and State v.
Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn. 1996) ("nexus"), with United States v. Mohney,
949 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (6th CiT. 1991) (considering the same factors as the Fifth Circuit
did in discussing the nexus relationship in Britt), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 464 F.
Supp. 227, 230-31 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (relying on the fact that the corporate officer worked
in the corporate suite), and State v. Williams, 417 A.2d 1046, 1048 (N.J. 1980) (relying
on the defendant's work connection to the storage closet searched as a basis for estab
lishing his right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim).
145. See Britt, 508 F.2d at 1056; LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(d), at 164-65 ("In
the absence of some other basis for showing standing, ... it still seems necessary to
establish that the place searched was rather directly connected with the defendant's
employment responsibilities and activities.").
146. 508 F.2d at 1056.
147. [d. at 1055. The office where the corporation conducted its daily business
had also been searched. [d. at 1053-54.
148. See id. at 1055 (discussing the usual rule that applies where corporate prop
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The Fifth Circuit held that Britt failed to establish that basis since
there was no "demonstrated nexus between the area searched and
the workspace of the defendant."149
The Britt court enumerated several factors that mitigated
against a finding of the requisite nexus. 150 Britt had never worked
in the area searched. In addition, the documents seized were
neither prepared by him nor taken from his personal work area,
which was located in another building. Finally, he was not present
when the search took place. The court concluded that, unlike the
Union vice-president in Mancusi, Britt failed to establish a nexus
between the area searched and his workspace. 151
Britt indicates that an employee may demonstrate a nexus
where she performs some work-related duties in an area, even if
that area is not her primary workspace. This reasoning is consistent
with a pre-Britt decision in which corporate officers who worked in
a corporate suite were entitled to assert Fourth Amendment claims
where areas beyond their office were searched. 152 Likewise, in a
later case, a custodian was found to have a legitimate privacy expec
tation in a storage room in which he kept his tools. 153 Where the
contact is infrequent or there is less physical proximity between the
area searched and the. employee's workspace, the nexus may be too
tenuous to provide a basis upon which to assert a Fourth Amend
ment claim. 154
erty is at issue). See also supra notes 53·57 and accompanying text for the case law
from which this rule originates.
149. Id. at 1056. The Mancusi decision never expressly discussed a nexus require
ment. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). See also supra Part LB.1 for a
discussion of Mancusi.
150. Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055.
151. Id. at 1056.
152. United States v. Lefkowitz, 464 F. Supp. 227, 231 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (expressly
rejecting the governments contention that the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights
should be limited to their own office and extending the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection to include the entire suite).
153. State v. Williams, 417 A.2d 1046, 1048 (N.J. 1980). The storage closet, lo
cated in the basement of a tavern, was not accessible to the public and was kept locked.
Id.
154. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1404 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a corporate officer, who operate'd his business as a sole proprietorship, could not
assert a claim where corporate papers were seized from an office that he rarely visited);
Chuang v. United States, 897 F.2d 646, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a bank presi
dent had not established a nexus where bank documents were seized from another bank
official's office on a different floor). The Chuang court emphasized that the defen
dant's office was on the fourth floor and the documents were seized from an office on
the third floor. Id. at 648, 650. The court was also influenced by the fact that the search
took place in a bank, an industry that is subject to intense oversight by the government.
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In addition to infrequency of use, use of the area for a non
work related purpose may weigh against demonstrating the requi
site nexus. These considerations were highlighted in an Indiana Su
preme Court decision, Tobias v. United States .155 In Tobias, the
defendant was a pharmacist in his father's pharmacy business. 156
The pharmacy contained two bathrooms, one for employees and
one for the public. 157 Employees had informed police that they sus
pected Tobias was dealing drugs when, on several occasions, they
noticed he and another person met briefly in the pharmacy and
then went to the public restroom in succession. 158 Police later re
trieved drugs from the area above the ceiling tiles in the bath
room.159 The court found that there was no nexus "since the only
time this area was visited by [the defendant] was for the purpose of
making the instant drug transaction. "160 Thus, the implication is
that the defendant might have established a nexus had he either
used the area with greater frequency or for its intended purpose.
Another factor that Britt indicated might establish a nexus be
tween the area searched and one's workspace is some role in the
preparation of the work materials seized. 161 The courts applying
the nexus test have not clarified whether one must actually draft the
documents or whether one could expressly direct a subordinate to
draft it on her behalf. However, in at least one case, a corporate
president's role in preparing the seized documents was insufficient
as the sole basis for asserting a Fourth Amendment claim.1 62
Although the Britt court mentioned presence at the search as a
See id. at 650. See supra Part l.A.2 for a discussion of lesser privacy expectation in
highly regulated industries pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
155. 479 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. 1985).
156. Id. at 509.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 510. The court's reliance on the nexus test seems odd in light of the
fact that the court could have decided the case based on the public access to the bath
room. See supra Part l.A.l for a discussion of the importance of the public/private
distinction in workplace searches.
161. United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1055 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that the
corporate records were not prepared by the defendant); see Mohney, 949 F.2d at 1403
(citing Britt and noting that lack of personal preparation of corporate materials seized
indicated one factor against finding a reasonable expectation of privacy).
162. United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989). The defendant
was also the sole shareholder of the corporation and its chief operating officer. Id. at
1411. The corporate documents were seized from a bookkeeping office in a different
building from the one in which the defendant worked. !d.
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factor to be considered,163 the Supreme Court's holding in Rakas
makes it clear that legitimate presence alone is no longer a suffi
cient basis for asserting a Fourth Amendment claim. 164 Thus, no
courts have held that presence at the search alone establishes the
requisite nexus.
In comparing the nexus test to the totality approach, similari
ties as well as distinctions emerge. Both approaches consider multi
ple factors to determine if an employee has demonstrated a
legitimate expectation of privacy.165 In addition, the nexus test's
consideration of the frequency of use of the area searched may like
wise bear on the employee's ability to control access by others
under the totality approach. 166 In contrast, the totality approach
may consider the defendant's position of authority as a basis to ex
clude others, while that fact is irrelevant in the nexus approach.167
In Part ILC, this Note next examines a recent Tenth Circuit deci
sion in which the court considered the competing merits of the two
approaches.
C.

The Nexus or Totality Approach?: United States v. Anderson

In United States v. Anderson,168 the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the nexus test should be applied where personal property
of an employee was seized in an area in which the defendant had
163. Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055.
164. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978) (rejecting "legitimately on the
premises" as a basis for asserting a claim).
165. Factors considered under the totality approach may include: the employee's
presence at the search, whether the employee has ownership interest in the item seized,
whether the employee took steps to guard their privacy, and whether the employee's
position relative to the business gave them particular rights to the area searched. See
supra note 117 for the factors applied by a district court in the First Circuit and their
comparison to those articulated by the Supreme Court. Under the nexus test, the court
may consider whether the employee worked in the area searched, whether they had a
role in the preparation of the documents, and whether the employee is present at the
search. See Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055.
166. See United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that
"[o]ccasional presence, [ ] without any right to exclude others, is not enough").
167. Compare United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1993) (consider
ing in its totality approach that the mayor had the authority to instruct others not to
enter his box in the attic archive), and United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 306 (1st Cir.
1980) (considering in its totality approach the defendant's position in the firm), with
United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1990) (giving no weight under the
nexus test to the fact that the defendant was the bank president), and United States v.
Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055 (giving no weight under the nexus test to the defendant's posi
tion as corporate president).
168. 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998).
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never worked. 169 The panel concluded, over a vigorous dissent by
Judge Kelly, that the court should not apply the nexus test because
it fails to account for certain relevant factors. 17o As a result, the
court decided to apply a three-part test consistent with the totality
approach.l71
The defendant, Anderson, had been suspected by the FBI of
interstate trafficking in child pornography.172 Anderson was set up
in a sting operation when an FBI informant sent him some tapes. 173
To the dismay of the agents, who had secured a warrant for his
home, Anderson took the tapes from the mail drop to his office
building. 174 It was a holiday weekend and Anderson entered the
locked building with the master key that he held as corporate vice
president.1 75 Anderson went to a vacant room some distance from
his office, closed the door, and pulled the curtains across the win
dowP6 Agents broke into the building and found Anderson pre
paring to watch the tapes.1 77 The agents then secured incriminating
statements and evidence from Anderson. 178
On appeal from the district court's decision suppressing the ev
idence, the government argued that Anderson did not have stand
ing to challenge the searchp9 It argued that he had neither a
possessory nor proprietary interest in the room searched, nor a
169. See id. at 1230-32 (discussing the merits and deficiencies of the nexus
approach).
170. Id. at 1232.
171. See id. at 1230 (stating that "the better approach is to examine all of the
circumstances of the working environment and the relevant search.") (citing Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968)). See also infra note 187 and accompanying text for
the three-part test.
172. Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1227.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1227-28. The key gave him universal access with the exception of the
president's office. Id. at 1228-29.
176. Id. at 1227. The office was in the interior section of the building. Id. The
dissent noted that the room was far from Anderson's office. Id. at 1236 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
177. The FBI agent broke in when they became concerned that Anderson would
destroy evidence once he discovered the tapes were blank. Id. at 1227-28. The agents
knocked, but were unaware that Anderson could not hear them since he was not wear
ing his hearing aids. Id. at 1228.
178. Id. at 1228. Some pornography was seized from a location in Anderson's
office that he identified for them. See id.
179. Id. at 1229. The government also argued that exigent circumstances created
an exception to the warrant requirement, id., but the circuit court affirmed the lower
court's holding that the government failed to meet the requisite standards to prove
exigency. Id. at 1233-34.
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nexus between his job and the room searched. 180 The district court
had relied upon the defendant's position as corporate vice-presi
dent and his possession of a master key as a basis for standing. 181
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. 182 The
court first discussed the merits of applying the nexus test, noting
that the test is often applied in workplace contexts since it is usually
work-related materials that have been seized in such searches.1 83 It
agreed that a nexus is an important consideration under those cir
cumstances. 184 The court rejected the premise, however, that
whether an employee works in the area searched should be disposi
tive in her Fourth Amendment claim.185 It concluded that the
nexus test is inadequate since it fails to account for factors the court
thought relevant to an employee's right to contest a search.1 86
Relevant factors for the Tenth Circuit included an employee's
relationship to the item seized, such as bailment or ownership;
whether the employee had control over the item at the time it was
seized; and whether the employee took steps to maintain privacy
relative to the item.187 The court also noted that the authority to
exclude others from the area searched is an important considera
tion. 188 The court cited several Supreme Court cases in support of
the application of these factors.189 After applying these factors to
180. See id. at 1229. The government's argument was similar to the criteria ap
plied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Chuang, in which the court held that the
defendant had to show both a proprietary or possessory interest in the area searched as
well as a nexus to his workspace. 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990).
181. Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1228-29.
182. Id. at 1229.
183. [d. at 1230.
184. [d.
185. Id. ("We endorse the 'business nexus' test to the extent we share a belief
that an employee enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in his work space ...
However, we do not believe the fact that a defendant does or does not work in a partic
ular area should categorically control his ability to challenge a warrantless search.")
186. [d.
187. Id. at 1231-32. .
188. Id. at 1232' n.3 (rejecting the government's analogy between the instant case
and apartment cases in which the courts have held that tenants do not have reasonable
expectations of privacy in common areas).
189. See id. at 1231-32. The court relied upon O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
715-16 (1986), Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980), and United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980) as support for the importance of property rights as a
relevant consideration. Id. at 1231. The court cited Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,
369 (1968), as support for its reliance on the factor considering an employee's control
over the item. Id. at 1232. Finally, the court cited Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,148-49
(1978), for the proposition that an employee's right to exclude others is an important
factor. [d. at 1232 n.3.
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the circumstances, the court concluded that Anderson had demon
strated a legitimate expectation of privacy in light of his efforts to
exclude others from the room and his control over the items at the
time of the search. l90
Judge Kelly argued in dissent that absent a nexus between the
area searched and Anderson's workspace, his claim should fail,191
The majority's approach failed to consider that Fourth Amendment
protectiOJ:l is more limited in commercial premises. 192 It also put
too much emphasis on Anderson's relationship to the item
seized. 193 Judge Kelly argued that under the majority's analysis,
Anderson would have been able to challenge a claim anywhere in
the building, as long as he kept the tapes in his possession and took
steps to maintain his privacy,194
In this case, Judge Kelly argued, there was no nexus. The room
in which Anderson was found was not his office. It was located
some distance from his office, it was a vacant room, and it was ac
cessible to other employees,195 There was no evjdence that Ander
son had ever worked in the room. 196 Furthermore, Judge Kelly
concluded that there was no evidence to support the majority's
finding that Anderson had the right to exclude others from the
190. Id. at 1233.
191. Id. at 1235 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Judge Kelly did not argue that the factors
mentioned by the majority were irrelevant, just insufficient" without a proven nexus. See
id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
192. See id. (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Dewey v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99
(1981)). It is noteworthy that the case Judge Kelly cites is one in which the Supreme
Court stated this difference in the context of heavily regulated industries. See supra
Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the reduced scope of Fourth Amendment protection in a
heavily regulated industry.
193. See Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1235-36 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The courts are not
uniform in their approach to the question of whether a defendant must demonstrate a
privacy expectation with regards to the item or the place searched. Compare United
States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989) ("privacy or property interest in
premises searched or item seized") (emphasis added), and State v. Williams, 417 A.2d
1046, 1048 (N.J. 1980) ("test is whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the property or premises involved") (emphasis added), with United States v.
Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1993) ("defendant must demonstrate a privacy expec
tation in both the item seized and the place searched) (emphasis added) and United
States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) ("question ... focuses principally on
whether [the defendant] has made a sufficient possessory or proprietary interest in the
area searched) (emphasis added), and State v. Worrell, 666 P.2d 703, 705 (Kan. 1983)
("[T]est ... is not whether that person 'had a possessory interest in the item seized, but
whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched."') (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
194. Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1235 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1236 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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room. 197
The Anderson opinions exemplify the conflicting views held by
the courts as to what creates the basis upon which an employee may
establish a legitimate privacy expectation. The nexus approach re
lies upon the legitimate privacy expectations created in the em
ployee's own workspace and then expands the protection afforded
in that space if a sufficient connection can be made to the area
searched. 198 The totality approach considers various factors but
often relies upon a showing that sufficient efforts were made to pro
tect one's privacy by excluding others to establish the requisite pri
vacy expectations. 199
In the next section, this Note argues that the basis of an em
ployee's privacy expectations is, instead, created through the em
ployment relationship. It further argues that the nexus and totality
approaches, as applied, are deficient in protecting employees'
Fourth Amendment rights beyond their own workspace by failing
to recognize this basis. Part III suggests an alternative approach
that makes the employment relationship the central focus of deter
mining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection in workplace
searches.
III.

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AS A SOURCE OF
PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS

In order to assess the merits of the approaches currently taken
by the courts or an alternative to those approaches, it is important
to consider the context in which this issue arises. Part lILA begins
with a discussion of how employees function in the workplace: what
kinds of relationships are created and what kind of rights and obli
197. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that "one does not gain such right merely
by closing the door and covering a window"). Judge Kelly did not discuss the fact that
Anderson's master key may have given him access to the building that others might not
have had.
198. See id. at 1235 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that an employee's Fourth
Amendment claim cannot prevail "absent a 'demonstrated nexus between the area
searched and the workspace of the defendant"') (quoting United States v. Britt, 508
F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975».
199. See id. at 1232 (calling the authority to exclude an important consideration,
focusing on the defendant's dominion and control over the item as well as the efforts
taken to keep others out of the room); United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 110 (10th
Cir. 1993) (focusing on the steps that the mayor had taken to ensure that others would
not have access to his belongings even though the attic was an area to which limited
people had access); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 306 (1st Cir. 1980) (focusing
on the security measures taken by the firm to restrict access and the positions of the
defendants which entitled them to access).
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gations arise from those relationships. Part III.B cntIques the
nexus and totality approaches as applied by the courts in light of the
importance of this relationship. Part III.C explains why the current,
narrower scope of Fourth Amendment protection that the courts
have defined for the workplace has the potential to create unin
tended adverse consequences in both the workplace and beyond.
Finally, Part III.D suggests an alternative approach that accounts
for the importance of the employment relationship in creating pri
vacy expectations. This approach recognizes important Fourth
Amendment limiting principles while creating a sufficiently broad
scope of protection to protect legitimate privacy expectations.
A.

The Workplace & The Employment Relationship

The workplace is, by necessity, an environment that requires a
degree of cooperation amongst employees in order to accomplish a
shared goal or goals set by the employer.2°O The shared goal may
be as broad as achieving targeted sales or profits, creating a final
product, improving the quality of goods or services, or increasing
the number of customers served. 201 In order to accomplish this
goal, it is common for an employer to delegate duties and responsi
bilities to various employees.
Once an employer202 hires an employee to help it achieve its
goals, an agency relationship is created between the parties which
gives rise to certain obligations and expectations. 203 A fiduciary
duty is created, obligating the employee to make certain efforts to
200. See generally Cynthia L. EstIund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil
Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing the importance of the workplace
to democratic society because of its ability to foster ongoing cooperative relations of
trust and common interest among individuals). Trends indicate that workplace models
that further facilitate a cooperative environment are increasing amongst employers.
See Estlund, supra, at 67 (noting "many firms are moving towards more cooperative
modes of organization, more diffuse authority relations, and flatter organizational pyra
mids"); Jerry Ackerman, Dawn of the Space Age: The New Trend in Office Design Aims
for Fewer Walls and a Collaborative Atmosphere - Office Design Moves Toward Open
Space Offices - Offices Move Out in Open K, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2000, at K1; The
Case For Teams, PURCHASING MAGAZINE, June 3, 1999, at 108.
201. The function of goals as easily applies to large scale, legitimate businesses as
small scale, illegal ones. For instance, a group selling drugs on street corners has profit
goals and may look to expand its customer base.
202. An employer could be a sole proprietor or a corporation that acts through its
corporate officers.
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1) (2000 App.) ("Agency is a
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of control by one person to an
other that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the
other to so act. ").
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protect the employer from harm. 204 This duty also imposes limita
tions on the employee's freedom of action.20s In some instances, an
employer may reciprocate by offering legal protection to the em
ployee by indemnifying them for actions taken within the scope of
employment.206
The importance of the employment relationship in affecting
workplace privacy expectations is demonstrated by the fact that
courts have found employees' consent to police searches in the
workplace valid absent express authorization. 207 Although the
courts have no uniform approach to determining the validity of em
ployee consent, many courts rely upon the principal-agent relation
ship as a basis for such authority.20s Additionally, courts have
relied upon joint access or control, assumption of risk by the em
ployer, and apparent authority as a rationale for upholding em
ployee consent to a search.209
This agency/employment relationship creates privacy expecta
tions in the employer since she would justifiably expect her employ
ees not to do her harm. Because of the necessity of collaboration
and work delegation required to accomplish shared goals, an em
204. See id. § 13 ("An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope
of his agency.").
205. See id. § 379 (imposing duty of care and skill on employee); § 393 (restricting
an employee's right to compete with the principal's business); § 395 (forbidding an em
ployee from acting in concert with those whose interests conflict with the employer);
§ 395-96 (restricting an employee's ability to disclose confidential information both dur
ing employment and after it terminates).
206. See, e.g., 1 FOLKS ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, § 145
(4th ed. 2000 Supp.) ("Indemnification of officers, directors, employees and agents; in
surance"); see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818 (Del. 1992) (affirming
an agreement indemnifying the corporate director).
207. See United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding
consent valid where the deputy sheriff consented to a search of the sheriff's office);
United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d 759, 764-66 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding consent
valid where a research assistant allowed the search of a professor's university lab which
he had permission to use).
208. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 8.6(c) (discussing employee consent
and noting that the courts are influenced by factors such as the employee's duties rela
tive to the area searched and the employee's status).
209. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 (1974) (finding consent valid
where there is "joint access or control for most purposes"); United States v. Sells, 496
F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1974) (relying on apparent authority); United States v. Grigsby,
367 F. Supp. 900, 902 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (relying upon assumption of risk); Common
wealth v. Wahlstrom, 375 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Mass. 1978) (relying on apparent authority);
see also Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1642 (1987) (noting that third-party consent has
been justified on an assumption of risk rationale as well as reduced expectations of
privacy).
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ployer must also expect employees collectively to protect her pri
vacy expectations. As one scholar has noted, "[t]he necessarily
cooperative and social nature of work itself also tends to depend
upon and to engender trust among coworkers."2Io As a result, pri
vacy expectations are created in the employee regarding work
materials from those outside of the business or those employees
whose job responsibilities do not entitle them to access. 2II The em
ployer's privacy expectation in work materials is, thus, extended
from the employer to the employee. 212
Employees' privacy expectations with respect to their personal
property raises different issues since the employer does not have a
similar privacy interest in those items. Several members of the Su
preme Court have recognized that "an employee's private life must
intersect with the workplace" and therefore, "tidy distinctions [ ]
between the workplace and professional affairs, on the one hand,
and personal possessions and private activities, on the other, do not
exist in reality."213 Employers may also take affirmative steps to
create privacy expectations with respect to personal items by ac
tions that further blur the previously distinct spheres of personal
and professional lives: allowing or encouraging employees to deco
rate work areas with personal items; offering on-site personal ser
vices such as day care, health clubs, and shower facilities; or
arranging social functions in the workplace.
B.

The Recognition of Relationships as a Basis for Privacy
Expectations

Both the courts and commentators have recognized relation
ships as a source of shared privacy rights. The Supreme Court, in
210. Estlund, supra note 200, at 10.
211. This view is supported by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mancusi v. De
Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). The Court found that the defendant had a legitimate expec
tation of privacy in documents that were merely in his custody despite the fact that
numerous others were entitled to access to the office and the seized documents. Id. at
367-69. DeForte, the other union officials who shared the office, and union higher-ups
all had access to the documents. [d. at 369. See supra Part l.B.l for a discussion of
Mancusi.
212. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text explaining how the Supreme
Court has recognized in other contexts how a person possessing legitimate privacy ex
pectations may extend their Fourth Amendment protection to another on the basis of a
certain kind of relationship. See generally Coombs, supra note 209 (discussing how
privacy rights are shared as a result of relationships in other contexts and arguing for a
broader recognition of this basis of privacy expectations).
213. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
Uoined by three other justices).
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contexts other than the workplace, has recognized the importance
of relationships in creating privacy expectations, albeit most often
by finding the relationship too insubstantial to engender such ex
pectations. 214 The Court has differentiated between an overnight
guest's and a casual visitor's relationship to a homeowner as an im
portant distinction in Fourth Amendment claims. 2Is It has rea
soned that an overnight guest has legitimate privacy expectations in
the host's home because the homeowner has chosen to extend his
protection to her. 216 The Court has also found that a homeowner's
ultimate control over the house is not incompatible with a guest's
legitimate expectation of privacy therein. 217 As a result, the scope
of protection established by the relationship extends to areas be
yond those set aside for the overnight guest's personal use. 2IS
One relationship-based theory that has been applied in the
lower courts outside of the Fourth Amendment context has been
214. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (holding that the lack of
connection between the defendant and the homeowner was a factor mitigating against
his right to object to a search); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (rejecting
the defendant's claim, in part, because the defendant had only known the person who
was holding his drugs for a few days and had never asked her to hold goods for him
before). In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court's opinion was replete with
references to the importance of relationships and why the Court should not recognize
less substantial ones as protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 142 (rejecting
"legitimately on the premises" since it would allow a casual visitor to object to searches
in areas to which they had not had access); id. at 142 n.12 (discussing a trespasser's lack
of rights); id. at 433 (rejecting the defendant's claims since they were "merely"
passengers).
215. Compare Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1990) (overnight guest
may assert a Fourth Amendment claim), and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265
67 (1960) (overnight guest may assert a claim) overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1983), with Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91 (casual visitor en
gaged in commercial transaction may not assert a claim). See also United States v.
Rodriguez-Lopez, No. 98-10075, 1999 WL 109632, at *1 (Feb. 26,1999 9th Cir.) for an
interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Carter to mean that "ordinary social
or business visitors enjoy no personal expectation of privacy in the homes of others,"
and supra note 20 for information on the continuing vitality of Jones and Fourth
Amendment rights for overnight guests.
216. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99 (stating that "[t]he houseguest is there with the permis
sion of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest.") (em
phasis added); see also United States v. Osorio, 949 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating
that "the Court reasoning in Olson that an overnight guest could depend on his host to
protect his privacy interests").
217. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99.
218. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1960) (citing Jones v. United
States for the proposition that simply because an area was not set aside for Jones' per
sonal use, it did not diminish his standing rights in that area as an overnight guest). But
see Osorio, 949 F.2d at 41 (stating in dicta that a guest cannot have privacy expectations
in areas of the host's house that are off limit or of which the guest has no knowledge).
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that of constructive possession. 219 Construct'ive possession means
that a person has the power and intention to exercise control over
property either directly or through other persons. 220 It may be held
jointly or solely.221 Constructive possession as a basis for Fourth
Amendment rights has been raised but not addressed yet by the
Supreme Court. 222
The Ninth Circuit, however, has embraced a related theory,
which it refers to as the "co-conspirator" exception. 223 Under this
theory, courts may extend the scope of Fourth Amendment protec
tion beyond an area over which a person has exclusive control
where the person asserting the claim can demonstrate a "formal ar
rangement for joint control" between themselves and the person
whose property was seized.224 The court considers "the degree of
cooperation and the respective possessory interest asserted."225
The court has most often found the requisite relationship where the
defendant had some ownership interest in the seized property,226
but it has indicated that significant evidence of a formalized ar
rangement or presence at the search and a lesser quantum of evi
dence of a formal arrangement may suffice. 227
219. The courts have recognized constructive possession as a legal theory in drug
possession cases. See United States v. Stockheimer, 807 F.2d 610, 615·16 (7th Cir.
1986); Commonwealth v. Bonilla, 590 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
220. United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1975).
221. Stockheimer, 807 F.2d at 615.
222. In Brown v. United States, the defendants raised a joint possession/co-con
spirator defense. 411 U.S. 223 at 230 n.4 (1973). The Court did not address the issue
since it held that the conspiracy had terminated before the seizure took place. See id.
223. See generally Michelle Alexandria Curtis, Note, Ninth Circuit Joint Venture
Standing: A Joint Possessory Interest is Sufficient to Establish Fourth Amendment Stand
ing, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 311 (1992) for an extended discussion of this approach in various
settings.
224. United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 671(9th Cir. 1991) (citing Schowen
gardt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1987)) (calling the co
conspirator approach an exception "to the general Rakas rule against contesting the
violation of another person's fourth amendment rights.").
225. Id. (noting that while the phrase could encompass a range of conduct, from a
formal contract to any loose arrangement for a cooperative illegal venture, the correct
meaning lies somewhere in between).
226. See id. (noting that in "virtually every case applying the exception," the per
son asserted a property interest); see also United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131, 1136
(9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Quinn, 751 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
227. Taketa, 923 F.2d at 671-72. The court has rejected the application of the ex
ception where simply a criminal conspiracy takes place in a specific location. Id. Thus,
a defendant could not assert a claim where his employer's property was used for unau
thorized purposes in another employee/co-conspirator's office. See id. at 668-69, 671-72
(holding that a DEA agent could not assert the co-conspirator exception where he was
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Professor Mary Coombs has argued that the courts should
adopt a relational model for analyzing Fourth Amendment
claims. 228 She notes that the concept of shared privacy better re
flects the way in which people actually behave in the world. 229
Under her approach, those who may assert a claim "include deriva
tive claimants - people with a. relationship with the primary
rightholder such that we would expect the primary rightholder to
share the umbrella of her claim."230 The courts could incorporate
these relational notions of privacy as part of the totality of the cir
cumstances approach. 231
In sum, there is support for the concept of relationships as a
basis for Fourth Amendment rights. Like the guest who expects the
host not to allow others to enter the home whose interest is adverse
to the guest,232 the employee has similar expectations of her em
ployer. In addition, the collaborative environment of the work
place creates the necessary "degree of cooperation" required under
the Ninth Circuit's ajJproach.233 The obligations that arise as a re
sult of the employment relationship likewise establish a sufficiently
"formal relationship for control" to establish an adequate basis for
finding shared privacy rights. 234 Consequently, any analysis that
considers an employee's Fourth Amendment rights should consider
the nature of the employment relationship .
C.

.

Evaluating the Totality & Nexus Approaches

Both the nexus and totality approaches to some degree con
sider the employment relationship when determining an employee's
right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim beyond their workspace.
The nexus test takes into account whether the employee asserting
the claim played any role in preparing seized documents. 235 Also
by considering whether the employee worked in the area searched,
using a DEA pen register in a co-worker's office to record phone numbers in contra
vention of DEA policy requiring judicial authorization before taking such action).
228. See generally Coombs, supra note 209.
229. Id. at 1596-97.
230. [d. at 1597.
231. See id. at 1598, 1650-61 (articulating the various considerations relevant to
such an analysis).
232. See Minnesota v. Carter, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (noting that it is unlikely that
a homeowner would invite someone into the house contrary to the guest's wishes).
233. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of these crite
ria under the Ninth Circuit's co-conspirator exception.
234. See id.
235. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text for the application of this
criterion.
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the nexus test indirectly considers the employment relationship.236
The totality test also indirectly considers this relationship where the
courts consider an employee's position as it relates to her authority
to exclude others from the area searched. 237
Both tests, however, fail to adequately recognize important as
pects of the employment relationship in establishing an employee's
privacy expectations. The nexus test ignores the realities of work
place delegation of duties. Under the nexus-test, despite ultimate
responsibility for information contained in corporate documents, a
corporate officer may fail to demonstrate a nexus where he has not
personally prepared the documents.238 The nexus test does not
consider that the process of work delegation may create several
parties with an interest in a document: the person who initiates the
project, the person who actually prepares the document, and the
person who has custody of the document. Consistent with the Su
preme Court's holding in Mancusi v. DeForte, all parties are likely
to have an expectation of privacy that the document will only be
shared with those within the workplace who are entitled to
access. 239
The totality test ignores an important aspect of the employ
ment relationship by focusing to a large degree on the employee's
effort to exclude others from access rather than the employee's
right to exclude. 240 An employee's right to exclude is a direct result
236. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text for the application of this
criterion.
237. See United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1993) (considering the
defendant's position as mayor for nineteen years); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299,
306 (1st Cir. 1980) (including the defendants' positions in the firm as specific considera
tions). But see United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1998) (re
jecting the lower court's reliance on the defendant's position as a corporate officer and
the fact that he had a master key as a basis for privacy expectations).
238. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1403 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding no
nexus where the sole proprietor of businesses rarely visited the office and was com
pletely uninvolved in the preparation of the materials); United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d
1052, 1055 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that there was no nexus where the president of the
corporation did not prepare the documents and did not work in the building where the
documents were stored).
239. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (noting that DeForte could
"reasonably have expected that only those persons and their personal or business guests
would enter the office and that the records would not be touched except with their
permission or that of union higher-ups.")
240. This is best exemplified in the Anderson decision, in which the Tenth Circuit
rejected the lower court's basis for privacy expectations, the defendant's position as a
corporate officer, and focused on all the steps the defendant took to exclude others
from the room searched. See Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1233; see also United States v.
Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the defendant's as
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of the employment relationship, whereas efforts to exclude may not
be. 241 An even more troubling aspect of this focus is that it may
yield results more consistent with the lesser privacy standard em
ployed by the courts where the government conducts a search in
their capacity as employer. 242
Under both the nexus and totality approaches, the courts have
erroneously focused on the Supreme Court's Mancusi decision as
standing for the principal that an office is a place in which privacy
expectations exist, even where it is shared by others. 243 By focusing
on that aspect of Mancusi, the courts have failed to apply its more
significant recognition that the employment relationship creates a
privacy expectation in relation to outsiders, not fellow employees
who were entitled to access or persons given access by those
employees. 244
serted privacy expectations in his shed in which he ran a business since he failed to lock
the door or take other measures to exclude others).
241. For instance, an employee could enter the company president's office in his
absence, close the curtains, lock the door, and view confidential documents in the presi
dent's file cabinet. The employee has excluded others through his efforts but has no
right to do so.
242. Compare State v. Worrell, 666 P.2d 703, 706 (Kan. 1983) (holding under the
totality approach that the warehouse manager had no privacy expectation where others
had access to the area searched), with Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding that under the reasonableness standard, a law clerk had no privacy ex
pectation in chambers' appurtenances, desks, file cabinets, or other workspaces due to
the open access of documents between judges and clerks). This may, in part, result
from the subjectivity inherent in the totality's balancing approach. See generally Na
dine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales
Through the Least Intrusive Analysis, 63 N.Y. L. REV. 1173, 1184-1207 (1988) (criticiz
ing Fourth Amendment balancing tests generally and in particular for their
subjectivity).
243. See United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing
Mancusi for the principle that one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in one's own
office); United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Mancusi for
the principle that there was a demonstrated nexus between the area searched and De
Forte's workspace); State v. Worrell, 666 P.2d 703, 706 (Kan. 1983) (citing Mancusi for
the principle of privacy expectations in one's own office). But see United States v.
Cardoza-Hinojsa, 140 F.3d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the defendant's reliance
on the Mancusi principle that access by others does not defeat privacy expectations
where the defendant could not show a right to exclude others from his unlocked shed).
244. The Mancusi Court made it clear that DeForte's privacy expectation was
created in relationship to intrusion by government officials, not with regard to co-work
ers who were entitled to access through their employment relationship. See Mancusi,
392 U.S. at 369 (stating that "DeForte could reasonably have expected only those [with
whom he shared an office] and their personal guests would enter the office, and that
records would not be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups.
This expectation was inevitably defeated by the entrance of state officials ...."); see
also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) ("The employee's expectation of
privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom
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In addition, the short shrift given in both approaches to the
importance of the employment relationship is inconsistent with the
courts' willingness to rely on it as a basis for allowing employees to
consent to searches in the workplace. 245 If the employer has con
ferred upon the employee sufficient rights to allow them to consent
to a search, she logically has conferred commensurate privacy
expectations. 246
It is evident that the nexus and totality tests fail to recognize
the importance of the employment relationship in establishing pri
vacy expectations. This result is inconsistent with the Mancusi ra
tionale and the Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of
relationships in determining privacy expectations. Consequently, a
different approach is needed which accounts for this relationship.

D.

Crafting a Relationship-Based Approach: A Broader Scope of
Workplace Privacy
1.

The Importance of Expanding the Scope of Workplace
Privacy

An employment relationship could be defined either in broad
or narrow terms, depending on how one views the degree of protec
tion afforded to an employee under the Fourth Amendment. This
Note suggests that the relationship should be broadly defined for
three reasons: the time spent in the workplace, the need for deter
rence against unwarranted government intrusion upon privacy
rights, and the implications created by a narrower definition to ar
eas beyond the traditional workplace.
Americans view privacy as a fundamental right. 247 Conse
quently, it is important to assure that this right extends to a place in
which people spend significant amounts of time. While the Fourth
a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and
personal invitees.").
245. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 8.6(c) (noting that "the agency test [for deter
mining consent of workplace searches] appears to have retained some of its force in the
employee consent cases because its relevance is more apparent in such a context").
246. See Craig M. Bradley, 35 AUG TRIAL 75, 75 (1999) (arguing that the courts
should treat the right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim and the right to consent to a
search consistently); Coombs, supra note 209, at 1638-48 (noting the logical connection
between third party consent and derivative Fourth Amendment claims and explaining
the basis for third party consent).
247. See Mayer, supra note 9, at 625 n.1 (1992) (citing a 1990 poll conducted in
which "79% of Americans agreed that if the Declaration of Independence were re
written, privacy should be added to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as a 'fun
damental right' ").
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Amendment routinely protects a person's privacy in their own
home, working people are likely to spend more of their waking
hours at work than at home. 248 Recent studies indicate that the
average workweek has increased in the last twenty years. 249 At the
same time, the average time spent at home has decreased. 250 Some
members of the Supreme Court have noted that with so much time
spent at work, "the workplace has become another home for most
working Americans. "251
Also, broader workplace protections deter the government
from unlawful and intrusive conduct. 252 The Fourth Amendment
was created to ensure that the government adheres to certain mea
sures before intruding on citizens' rights. 253 With the gaping holes
left in workplace privacy by the courts, a great incentive is left for
police to cast a broad net in workplace searches, knowing that the
courts will limit privacy rights. 254 Broad workplace protection cre
ates a disincentive for police to disregard warrant requirements.
248. See Estlund, supra note 200, at 8-9 nn.19-22.
249. See Sabrina Jones, Stretched to Their Limits, News and Observer (Raleigh,
NC), June 6, 1999, at El (citing a survey by the Families and Work Institute in which
they found that average work hours increased from 43.6 hours in 1977 to 47.1 in 1997).
The survey also found that 13% of wage and salaried workers, most of who work full
time, have a second job. See Families and Work Institute, 1997 National Study of the
Changing Workforce, http://www.familiesandwork.org.
250. See Jones, supra note 249 (noting that U[a]s the hours spent on the job have
risen, time at home has shrunk). The author cites a report by the Council of Economic
Advisors in which they found that working parents spend only 22 hours per week with
their children, a 14% decrease in the last three decades. See id.
251. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 u.S. 709, 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens).
252. This rationale obviously applies in contexts other than the workplace. See
Wallace W. Sherwood, Fourth Amendment Standing: Flat On Its Face, 36 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 441, 442 (1988) (stating generally about the Fourth Amendment that a U[n]arrow
construction of the scope of an individual's rights promotes the government's ability to
violate the Constitution and impedes the citizenry's ability to curtail such violations
through court").
253. In one of the first cases to discuss the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Court expressed concerns over minor encroachments by the government
that could eventually erode constitutional protections. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 635 (1886). The Boyd Court favored strong adherence to warrant require
ments unless the government established superior property rights. See id. at 623-24.
See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During The Lochner Era: Privacy, Prop
erty, And Liberty In Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 573-81 (1996) for an
excellent discussion of the Boyd case and its significance.
254. Many scholars have argued that by restricting Fourth Amendment rights and
thus reducing the need for the exclusionary rule, the Court has failed to provide an
adequate deterrent mechanism. Sherwood, supra note 252, at 441; Simien, supra note
86, at 539; Welsh S. White & Robert S. Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and
Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 348 (1970).
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expectations in traditionally protected areas, such as the home. The
Supreme Court recently held that, despite being an invited guest
into a person's residence, a lower expectation of privacy existed be
cause the relationship between the homeowner and the defendant
was of a commercial, rather than personal, nature. 255 It is not too
far a reach to extend this rationale to deny Fourth Amendment
rights to business guests in one's home for a dinner party or to
guests at a Tupperware party.
This rationale is particularly troublesome if one considers the
increasing numbers of people who work in their homes, whether on
a full-time or part-time basis.256 It is unclear based on the Court's
current rationale where or how a line would be drawn to distinguish
between commercial and personal Fourth Amendment protections.
Perhaps one standard of privacy rights would be applied in a home
office and another to the rest of the house. Whichever means may
be used, they pose troubling privacy concerns.
This recent decision presents precisely the kind of reasoning
that the first Supreme Court cautioned against. In Boyd v. United
States ,257 the Court warned that minor encroachments would erode
the Amendment's protection. 258 To guard against such encroach
ments, the Court advocated a broad scope of protection.259
Consequently, many factors weigh in favor of establishing a
broad definition of the employment relationship. A broader defini
tion would result in more expansive privacy protections in the
255. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (finding a lesser expectation of
privacy on property used for commercial purposes and for a commercial transaction);
see also United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that in
Carter, "the Supreme Court effectively heightened the burden for a defendant ... when
the defendant's presence in the dwelling is for a commercial or business purpose"). In
Carter, the defendant was given permission by a lessee to use her apartment to package
cocaine. 525 U.S. at 85-86. The defendant had never been to the apartment prior to the
incident and had been given use of the apartment in exchange for some drugs. /d. at 86.
256. See Big Gains in Work at Home, Boomer Report, July 1998, at 4 (citing Bu
reau of Labor Statistics finding that in 1997, 4.1 million self-employed people worked
out of their home and 3.6 million workers received some compensation from employers
for work at home).
257. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
258. See id. at 635.
259. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for the Boyd Court's statement on
the importance of a liberal interpretation of the Amendment in order to prevent
abuses. See also Cloud, supra note 253, at 576-77 (stating that Boyd's expansive theory
established the principle that even law enforcement goals could not trump fundamental
natural rights embodied in the Constitution).
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workplace. In light of the time most Americans spend at work, the
importance of deterring unlawful government intrusions, and the
implications of a narrower definition on areas outside of work
places, a more expansive scope of protection is warranted.
2.

The Analytical Framework

The approaches taken by the courts to address the question at
issue in this Note, whether an employee's privacy rights extend be
yond their own workspace, provide a fairly narrow scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. 260 This section of the Note suggests an al
ternative approach which recognizes the importance of the employ
ment relationship and which is more likely to provide a broader
scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
Since this Note's concept of the employment relationship is
predicated on the employer sharing her privacy rights with her em
ployees, the employer logically could not confer privacy expecta
tions that she herself does not have. Consequently, just as an
employer could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim where the
area searched is open to the public,261 neither could the employee.
Likewise, since employers in heavily regulated industries have re
duced expectations of privacy,262 employees in those industries
would have similarly reduced expectations.
In analyzing an employee's Fourth Amendment claim, the first
step should be to define the confines of the workplace. 263 This
means not only setting the boundaries, but also to make distinctions
260. This is exemplified most clearly in the courts applying the nexus test, in
which there are no examples of cases where the court found an employee had legitimate
expectations of privacy outside either their office or office suite. But see United States
v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing that in
United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1993), the mayor demonstrated a nexus
between the attic searched and his office because of the physical relationship between
the locations and the control the mayor exercised over the area). The Mancini court
had applied the totality test in analyzing the mayor's claim and, thus, did not directly
address the nexus criteria. See Mancini, 8 F.3d at 109 (discussing relevant factors).
261. See supra Part LA.l for a discussion of the effect that the public/private
distinction has on workplace searches.
262. See supra Part LA.2 for a discussion of lesser privacy expectations in closely
regulated industries.
263. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (noting that "[b]ecause the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy [ ] is understood to differ according to the
context, it is essential first to delineate the boundaries of the workplace context. The
workplace includes those areas and items related to work and are generally within the
employer's control").
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between public and private areas within the workplace. 264 In keep
ing with the Mancusi holding, an area should not be deemed public
simply because limited numbers of non-employees have access
while accompanied by employees. 265 These non-public areas would
be parts of the workplace in which the employee has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.
In the typical workplace claim, work-related materials have
been seized. 266 In these cases, the court's inquiry should focus on
whether the item seized relates in some manner to employee's job
responsibilities. 267 The court's inquiry thus would recognize the in
terconnected, collaborative nature of work. An employee who del
egates work to another would no longer lose Fourth Amendment
protection simply by failing to perform the task herself. 268 Like
wise, the person to whom the work is delegated is protected regard
less of whether she has the authority to retain the materials in her
possession. 269
Where a workplace seizure involves the employee's personal
items, the employer does not have the same privacy interests in the
item to share with the employee. Similarly, an employee could not
assume that co-workers would keep others from access. In those
cases, the employee would need to establish privacy expectations
264. See supra Part 1.A.1 for a discussion of the importance of the public/private
distinction in workplace searches.
265. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (noting that DeForte's
privacy expectations did not change simply because the workers with whom he shared
an office might allow their personal and business guests into the office). Some doubt
has been cast on this point by the Court's later decision in Rawlings v. Kentucky. 448
U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that access by others sufficiently reduced the defendant's pri
vacy expectation).
266. United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Most cases
that discuss employee standing involve seizure of work-related documents from the
workplace. ").
267. In some cases this would be obvious, but in others the court may look to a
contract between the parties or could require the employee to produce evidence to
establish such responsibilities.
268. This result distinguishes this approach from the nexus test. For example,
under the nexus test, a president of a company could not assert a Fourth Amendment
claim when he neither worked in the area searched nor prepared the documents. See
supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text for an example of this result. Under the
relationship-based approach, a president of a company would have the right to assert a
claim where any work-materials were seized.
269. Professor Mary Coombs, who ascribes to the importance of relationships as
a basis for Fourth Amendment rights, suggests that once a relationship has been estab
lished, the government may rebut the presumption that a sufficient relationship exists.
Coombs, supra note 209, at 1652 (noting that either party would be entitled to present
such proof).
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independent from the employer.27o Consistent with the approach
applied by the First and Tenth Circuit, the employee could do this
by showing steps taken to exclude others from access to the item. 271
This could be demonstrated through the employee's' presence,
through objective manifestations to keep others from access, or by
keeping the item in an area reserved for the employee's exclusive
use. 272 Consistent with the employment relationship rationale,
however, the employer could rightfully place limits on where the
employee may keep personal possessions beyond areas reserved for
the employee's personal use. 273
Using the employment relationship as a basis for analyzing pri
vacy expectations does not solve all of the questions that the myriad
of workplace situations may create. Yet, it applies to the vast ma
jority of contexts and offers a means by which the courts can recog
nize a broader scope of protection than that which the current
approaches provide. By recognizing the importance of relation
ships in creating privacy expectations, the courts may stem the tide
of eroding Fourth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION

Workplace privacy has deep historical roots. In Mancusi v. De
Forte, the Supn!me Court established that employees may have le
gitimate privacy expectations in even those areas of the workplace
that are shared with other employees. Subsequent decisions by the
Court in non-workplace contexts have raised the question as to
what extent an employee must be able to exclude others in order to
be able to assert Fourth Amendment claims beyond their own
workspace.
270. This is similar to the rationale the courts have used in requiring corporate
officers to establish independent privacy expectations from the corporation when the
corporation's property has been seized. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text
for a discussion of that issue.
271. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the First
Circuit's approach in United States v. Mancini, and supra Part ILC for a discussion of
the Tenth Circuit's approach in United States v. Anderson.
272. The courts have consistently supported an employee's right to assert a claim
on this basis. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, at § l1.3(d) (stating that "[iJf it is shown that
the place searched was a desk or similar area set aside for the exclusive use of the
defendant, then quite clearly the defendant will have standing").
273. Absent consent, the employee could not rightly assume that the employer
would limit access to those that share the employee's interests in her property. See
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (noting that a "host may admit or exclude
from the house as he prefers, but it is unlikely that he will admit someone who wants to
see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest.").
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Workplaces are unique environments in which individuals
often work in collaborative relationships to meet shared goals. The
employment relationship between the employer and employee
gives rise to legal rights and obligations. For this relationship to
function properly, an employer expects her employees to protect
her privacy interests. The employer shares her privacy with the em
ployee in order to accomplish these goals.
The two approaches taken by the lower courts, the totality of
circumstances approach and the nexus test, fail to adequately ac
count for the importance of this relationship in addressing the ques
tion of an employee's right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim
beyond her own workspace. The nexus test fails to take into ac
count the collaborative nature of workplace relationships. The to
tality approach relies on an employee's efforts to exclude others,
rather than the right to exclude given through the employment rela
tionship. Both approaches fail to recognize the Mancusi decision's
fundamental principle that an employee need not .demonstrate the
right to exclude other employees in order to assert a Fourth
Amendment claim.
Another approach is needed that recognizes the employment
relationship in order to create a broader scope of Fourth Amend
ment protection for employees. This broader scope is necessary
since employees spend most of their waking hours at work, as in
creased deterrence against unlawful government action, and to
stem the tide of eroding Fourth Amendment protection. An ap
proach that focuses on the employment relationship as a source of
privacy expectations, while recognizing traditional Fourth Amend
ment limiting principles, strikes the right balance ..
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